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Abstract 
Marketing assistance loan (MAL) and loan deficiency payment (LDP) programs 
differ in their treatment of basis. This paper analyzes marketing decisions under these 
programs when producers are differentiated by location with respect to the terminal 
market. The developed model may help explain the observed lack of an association 
between the county loan rate and the share of a county’s production enrolled in MAL 
programs. Under certain conditions, multiple equilibria are shown to emerge. The effects 
of MAL and LDP programs on welfare and policy implications are discussed. 
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LOCATION AND MARKETING UNDER MARKETING ASSISTANCE 
LOAN AND LOAN DEFICIENCY PAYMENT PROGRAMS 
Introduction 
As part of the governmental effort to support revenues for agricultural producers, the 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (the 1996 FAIR Act) launched 
non-recourse marketing assistance loan (MAL) and loan deficiency payment (LDP) 
programs for the 16 major crops. These programs expanded the set of marketing 
strategies available to producers, who could participate in either one but not both 
programs. Under MAL programs, eligible producers receive a non-recourse loan by using 
the stored crop as collateral. The amount of the loan is equal to the value of the crop 
priced at the fixed loan rate adjusted by county. Farmers always have the option of 
repaying the loan by delivering the crop to the Commodity Credit Corporation at loan 
maturity. The rules for repaying the loan in cash are as follows. If the so-called posted 
county price (PCP) is less than the loan rate on the day of the final sale, then the loan can 
be repaid at that price; otherwise, producers must repay the principal plus the accrued 
interest and expenses. The PCP is a calculated daily price index intended to echo the 
actual market conditions in the county. While on any given day the PCP may differ from 
the prices offered by local elevators, the adjustments made to determine the PCP and the 
county loan rate are largely equivalent and can be thought of as the county basis for the 
crop in question (Babcock, Hayes, and Kaus). Under LDP programs, producers receive 
the difference between the county loan rate and the PCP on any date as long as they own 
the crop and the difference is positive.  
 In 1998, when for the first time since the beginning of the programs grain prices 
were lower than the loan rates, grain farmers were confronted with a choice between the 
two programs (Hayes and Babcock). In the period from 1999 to 2001, agricultural 
producers seemed consistently to favor LDP over MAL programs (see Table 1). For 
producers who sell their crop at harvest, the choice between the two programs is likely to 
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 TABLE 1. National ratios of quantities under LDP and MAL programs  
Year Corn Soybeans Wheat 
1999 0.19 .12 .07 
2000 0.17 .13 .01 
2001 0.19 .12 .27 
Source: USDA, “Unofficial Price Support Programs Activity Reports.” 
 
be immaterial or governed by administrative costs. However, producers who market their 
crop after the harvest weigh the LDP against the combined values of the loan and the call 
option embedded in MAL programs. While the two programs differ in many respects, 
this paper emphasizes the difference in the “spatial” dimension. 
County Basis Adjustment in Loan Deficiency Payment and Marketing Assistance 
Loan Programs 
An important distinction between the effects of LDP and MAL programs on 
producer revenues arises because of the way the basis (or local market) conditions are 
incorporated into the respective payments. Babcock, Hayes, and Kaus point out that “if 
calculated properly, LDPs should be the same in every county in every state.”  In 
contrast, of course by design, the loan rates for most agricultural commodities differ 
across counties. Therefore, growers in areas closer to terminal markets receive higher 
subsidies under MAL programs. This happens because the county adjustment factor 
vanishes from the amount repaid at loan maturity for precisely the same reason that the 
LDPs are invariant to location. Consequently, growers in areas with a lower basis are 
expected to use MAL programs more than are growers in areas far from terminal markets 
because the loan rates in these areas are lower. 
Contradicting Empirical Evidence 
And so, the ratios of bushels under MAL and LDP programs in each county should 
be positively correlated with the county loan rate. However, this intuition runs counter to 
the empirical evidence presented in Figure 1, which plots the county ratios of bushels 
under MAL and LDP programs against the county loan rates for three selected crops. In 
each graph the smoothed dashed curve is the ratio averaged over counties with the same 
loan rate; the straight line is the fitted linear regression. Using ordinary least squares  
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(a)  Kansas Wheat in 2000 
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(b)  Iowa Corn in 2000 
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(c)  Iowa Soybeans in 2000 
 
Source: USDA, “Unofficial Price Support Programs Activity Reports.” 
 
FIGURE 1. The ratio of bushels placed under MAL and LDP programs for selected 
crops 
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(OLS) allows us to reject the hypothesis of a positive (or negative) relationship between 
the ratio of counties’ output enrolled in MAL and LDP programs and the county loan 
rates at the standard levels of statistical significance.1 As evident from the graphs, this 
could be, at least in part, a result of a considerable amount of variation in the MAL/LDP 
ratios in counties with the same loan rate. However, fitting OLS regressions for 
aggregated counties (i.e., counties with the same loan rate) does not yield statistically 
significant estimates. 
Several county or farm level attributes, other than location, are likely to affect the 
producer’s decision to enroll in either program. For example, adjustment factors used to 
calculate the county loan rates are typically set once a year and are changed infrequently. 
However, the actual county basis fluctuates daily and may consistently deviate from the 
county adjustment factor. Therefore, if the actual basis is smaller than the basis assumed 
in the county adjustment factor, producers in that county will favor LDP programs over 
MAL programs. In addition, access to credit, on-farm and off-farm storage costs and 
capacity, and livestock production are also likely to affect marketing decisions. While 
carefully accounting for such idiosyncrasies at the county (or even farm) level may 
explain the spatial pattern of the split between the two programs in individual cases, a 
different approach is possible. 
The goal of this paper is to reconcile the facts and the economic intuition by 
presenting a general argument demonstrating that location may play no role in the 
producer choice between the two programs. I provide a parsimonious explanation that 
does not involve any county-specific characteristics apart, of course, from the county loan 
rate. The explanation relies on endogenizing commodity prices by explicitly recognizing 
the supply and demand forces determining the intra-year dynamics and price paths. 
Because one of the conditions is that the share of the total production under MAL 
programs is relatively large, the suggested reasoning is more likely to apply in cases (b) 
and (c) in Figure 1 rather than in case (a). In panel (a), only a fraction of the area crop, 
wheat in Kansas, was enrolled in MAL programs in 2000 (less than 7 percent of the state 
production.) 
The supply mechanism in geographically dispersed commodity markets is consid-
ered next. To focus on the role of location in marketing decisions, the following 
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discussion assumes away any uncertainty characteristic of agricultural commodity 
markets that stems mainly from developments in international trade in a post-harvest 
environment.  
Prices and Marketing Patterns in Geographically Dispersed Markets 
As is well known from the storage literature (e.g., Williams and Wright), in a 
competitive market, carry-over (ending) stocks exist when the discounted price in the 
next period warrants delaying the sale and incurring storage costs. Similarly, within the 
marketing year, the opportunity cost of a delayed sale explains why commodity prices 
must rise over time to stimulate storage. Benirschka and Binkley show that in a 
geographically dispersed market where suppliers of the terminal end-use market are 
differentiated by location, transportation costs determine the optimal pattern of shipping. 
Firms with the lowest transportation costs supply the market first because “a producer 
close to the market has a relatively high opportunity cost of storage, [and] he will store 
commodities only for a short time.” Benirschka and Binkley also find that the market 
price grows at a rate smaller than the rate of interest because of the growing cost of 
shipment. This, of course, implies that the discounted market price falls as the marketing 
year progresses. 
Marketing Decisions under Marketing Assistance Loan and Loan Deficiency 
Payment Programs 
Consequently, MAL programs may disrupt the optimal “sequential” marketing 
pattern because producers that are close to the market will choose to participate in MAL 
programs and defer sale. As an extreme case, imagine that all producers exclusively use 
MAL programs. Also, suppose that the adjustment factors used to determine the county 
loan rates and the PCPs coincide with the actual local basis. Then, after taking a loan, the 
profits of the MAL program participants who market their crop after harvest will no 
longer depend on location. Thus, the pattern of spatial supply (the order in which 
producers market their crop) is arbitrary in this case. This feature of MAL programs 
underlies the argument used to explain the empirical evidence presented earlier.  
In contrast, LDP is a price support program that complements producer revenues 
without interfering with marketing decisions in the spatial dimension. This is so because 
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LDPs, at least theoretically, are the same for all producers, independent of their location. 
When intra-year prices are increasing over time, an LDP clearly has the greatest value at 
harvest. In that case, producers decide which program to use at harvest time because there 
is no value in postponing participating in either program. If both programs are in use, 
then producers closer to the market will take a loan and producers in more distant 
locations will take the relatively higher value LDP. 
Spatial and Temporal Commodity Markets with Endogenous Prices 
While for most bulk agricultural commodities prices are determined in international 
markets, domestic supply, at least in part, must be a contributing factor. Consider 
equilibrium where price is determined in a central market that is supplied by spatially 
differentiated producers in each period between the two harvests. Imagine that there are 
periods when market price in equilibrium without any programs is sufficiently high (or, 
alternatively, let the loan rate unadjusted for county basis be relatively low.) Then, once 
the price support programs are introduced, MAL producers will have an incentive to store 
and market their crop after harvest, which will lower the post-harvest prices. In periods 
when MAL producers supply the market, the discounted market price must fall as fast as 
the discounted value of the repayment amount on the loans taken by MAL producers. 
Otherwise, MAL producers will not be indifferent between marketing their crop this 
period or the next period. On the other hand, LDP producers (in areas with lower loan 
rates) choose the marketing time based on their differences in transportation costs. 
Because transportation costs are lower than the loan rate, the discounted market price 
falls slower than the discounted value of the repayment amount on the loans taken by 
MAL producers when LDP producers supply the market. Therefore, in equilibrium, MAL 
producers have an incentive to wait and supply the market after LDP producers have 
taken action. 
Multiple Equilibria and Equilibrium Where Returns to Storage Are Independent of 
Location 
In general, there may be multiple equilibrium time points when LDP producers give 
way to MAL producers in supplying the market. The set of such points is particularly 
large if, in the absence of the MAL program, in periods immediately following harvest, 
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market price is high enough to warrant shipments by producers enrolling in the MAL 
program were such to become available. As the share of producers who opt for the MAL 
program increases, the discounted market price begins to fall faster. This makes the LDP 
option less attractive, and more producers (in the areas with higher loan rates) will have 
an incentive to switch to the MAL alternative. On the other hand, it may happen that the 
fraction of producers who use the MAL program and store their crop is small. The 
discounted market price then falls sufficiently slowly (following the “optimal” time 
pattern) to warrant the use of the LDP program by the majority of producers (in the areas 
with lower loan rates).  
Conditions are provided on demand and supply environments such that only 
producers who market their crop at harvest use LDP programs. Then, only MAL program 
users engage in storage and supply the market during the rest of the year.  Ignoring the 
differences in administrative costs, for producers who market their crop at harvest, the 
payments under the LDP and MAL programs are equivalent. Consequently, the choice 
between the two programs becomes invariant to location. This may help rationalize the 
apparent lack of a positive relationship found in Figure 1 in cases where the share of 
production enrolled in MAL programs is substantial. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, a formal model with a fixed price 
sequence is developed. Then, marketing decisions under both programs, as well as the 
producer choice between the two programs, are analyzed. In the third section, an 
allowance is made for endogenous prices, and conditions sufficient for the existence of 
multiple equilibria are provided. The paper concludes with a discussion about the welfare 
implications of the analysis. 
 
Model 
Following Benirschka and Binkley, consider a market for a single commodity (grain) 
that is supplied by producers differentiated by their location relative to the terminal 
market, ]1,0[Îd . The focus is on the intra-year dynamics between the two harvests. 
Time is discrete and indexed by 1,...,0 += Tt , where 0=t  represents the harvest time 
and Tt =  is the end of the crop year. At 0=t , the distribution of grain over the uniform 
measure of producers is given by )(dF  where 0)0( =F , 1)1( =F , and F  is a 
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continuous and differentiable function with 0)()( ³=¢ dfdF  d" . The per unit transport 
cost (identified with basis) is proportional to distance and is given by d .2  If a producer 
chooses to sell his crop at any time after harvest, 0>t , then he incurs an additional 
storage cost 0>c  per unit of the crop. At time t , the inverse demand for grain at the 
terminal market is given by )( tt sPp =  where P  is a continuous and differentiable 
decreasing function with ¥=)0(P , and ts  is the supply of grain. Function P  possesses 
a well-defined inverse denoted by D . There is no uncertainty, and producers discount 
future profits at )1,0()1/(1 Î+= rb  where 0>r  is the per period risk-free interest rate. 
Competitive Equilibrium with Exogenous Prices 
For now, let the price sequence }{ tp  be fixed and known to producers. At harvest, 
the present value of the unit profit of the producer located at d who markets his crop at 
time t  is given by 
 
î
í
ì
>--
=-
=
0 if ,)(
0 if ,
),( 0
tcdp
tdp
td
t
tb
p . (1) 
Each producer chooses the marketing time t  that maximizes the discounted (unit) profit 
 ),(max)( tdd
t
pp = . (2) 
As a result, the equilibrium is characterized by the function )(* dt  that specifies the 
optimal timing of marketing for each producer.3 
RESULT 1. For any }{ tp , )()(
** stdt £  if sd < . 
Also, Result 1 immediately follows from Theorem 2.8.2 in Topkis (p. 77) because 
),( tdp  is supermodular in ),( td : 0ln/2 >-=¶¶¶ bbp ttd . Alternatively, the 
equilibrium can be described by the correspondences, ]1,0[:)(* ®ttd , that determine the 
set of producers that supply the terminal market at time t . Clearly, )(* td  is a convex 
interval because ),( tdp  is continuous and monotone in d  for each t . Let )(sup * tdd ut =  
and )(inf * tdd lt = , i.e., 
u
td  and 
l
td  are the locations of the marginal producers that 
market their crop at t . Denote by empty}not  is )(:{ * tdtT N =  the times when shipping 
takes place. Order elements in set NT  in increasing order and number them Nn ,..,1=  
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where TN £ . Then we can further characterize the competitive equilibrium in terms of 
the following arbitrage conditions. 
LEMMA 1. For any }{ tp , pick 
NTitit Î+ )1(  ),(  where 2³N .  Then 
)( )()1(
)()1(
)()(
u
itit
ititu
itit dpdp -=- +
-+b , )( )1()1(
)()1(
)1()(
l
itit
ititl
itit dpdp ++
-+
+ -=- b , and 
cdpdp ut
tu --=- )( 0)2(
)2(
00 b , cdpdp
l
tt
tl
t --=- )( )2()2(
)2(
)2(0 b , if 0)1( =t . 
An immediate corollary is that in equilibrium * )()1()( it
l
it
u
it ddd == + . Now we can 
identify prices }{ tp such that at each t  some shipping takes place, i.e., TN = . From 
Lemma 1 it follows that the equilibrium sequence }{ *td is then given by 
 cdpdp --=- )()( *01
*
00 b , (3a) 
 cdpdp tt
t
tt --=- + )()(
*
1
* b , Tt ,...,1= . (3b) 
Inspecting equations in (3) and using difference operators, ttt ppp -=D +1 , gives: 
RESULT 2. If and only if, for each 0>t , (a) cpp --< 100 b ; (b) cpp +D>D 10 b ; 
(c) 1+D>D tt pp b ;  (d) bb -<- + 11TT pp ; then there exist unique strictly increasing }{
*
td  
given by (3). 
Condition (c) in Result 2 holds when the price sequence increases at a decreasing 
rate. However, the price sequence that grows over time is not required for a “continuous” 
sequential supply in the competitive equilibrium unless the individual rationality (or 
participating) constraint is satisfied. If the option of staying out of production and earning 
zero profit is always available to producers, i.e.,  
 )],(,0[max)( tdd
t
pp = , (4) 
then condition 0>D tp  must, in fact, hold when shipping takes place each period. 
COROLLARY 1. If in equilibrium equations (3) hold, and (i) 0)1( ³p  or (ii) 1>Tp  
then 0>D tp  t" . 
Note that two properties of the equilibrium when market price is increasing and 
shipping takes place each period are interesting in light of some of the literature on 
storage in agricultural markets. 
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RESULT 3. Let conditions (a) – (d) in Result 2 hold. (i) Then we have rpp tt <D / . 
(ii) If 0>D tp  0>"t  then we have 0)/( >DD tt pp  for “small” b  and 0)/( <DD tt pp  
for “large” b  0>"t . 
Result 3 provides conditions such that the equilibrium (discrete) rate of growth of 
market prices, tt pp /D , is less than the interest rate (see Benirschka and Binkley for 
economic intuition and econometric implications of this result). As the marketing year 
progresses, the rate of growth increases when the interest rate, r , is “large,” and it 
decreases when r  is “small.”  While part (i) of the result is consonant with the analysis 
by Benirschka and Binkley, part (ii) extends their findings. 
Our next task is to establish that the competitive equilibrium in (3) satisfies some 
efficiency criteria. Clearly, because a producer’s dynamic maximization problem (2) is 
not subject to dynamic inconsistency and there are no market failures, competitive 
equilibrium must be socially optimal. We define the producers’ welfare function as the 
sum of the discounted producer surpluses: 
 å ò=
-
--+-=
T
t
d
d t
t
T
t
t
sdFcspdFdpddW
00000
1
)())(()()(),...,( b . (5) 
RESULT 4. For any }{ tp , the competitive equilibrium supply pattern }{
*
td  maxi-
mizes (5). 
Now we are in a position to explore how two price support programs, LDP and 
MAL, interact with marketing decisions and welfare properties of the competitive 
equilibrium. 
Loan Deficiency Payment Program 
The LDP program is a payment scheme administered by the government in order to 
complement revenues for the chosen agricultural commodities. An LDP is the difference 
between the set “loan rate” price, dLdL -=)( , 1>L , adjusted by location, and the 
actual price on the date producers apply for the payment given that they still own the crop 
at that time, dpt - . An LDP is then uniform across all producers who own the crop and 
is given by ]0,max[ tpL - . Under LDP, producer d ’s profit can be written as 
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ïî
ï
í
ì
££--+-
==-
=
tqcdppL
qtdpL
qtd
t
t
q
q
LDP
0 if ,)(]0,max[
0 if ,],max[
),,(
0
bb
p . (6) 
Now the choice variables are the time of the marketing, t , and the time of exercising 
the right to receive an LDP, tq £ . If qt = , then an LDP is equivalent to establishing the 
floor price L . Let the optimal time of marketing and receiving of the LDP for a producer 
located at d  be given by )(* dtL  and )(
* dq , respectively. 
RESULT 5. If }{ tp  is increasing, then 0)(
* =dq  and )()( ** dtdtL =  d" . 
Hence, when prices at the terminal market are growing over time, the LDP program 
provides a means of money transfer that does not interfere with marketing decisions. 
Marketing Assistance Loan Program 
An alternative payment scheme is based on loan payments. At any time prior to 
selling the crop, producers are eligible to obtain a “marketing” loan equal to the value of 
the crop priced using the fixed loan rate adjusted for basis, dLdL -=)( . Producers have 
to repay the full value of the loan only if they sell the crop at a price higher than dL - . 
For simplicity, we hold that the interest rate in that case is zero. Otherwise, the loan is 
repaid at the sale price that may be less than the loan rate. Therefore, this payment 
scheme provides loans with a non-positive interest rate to the benefit of producers. Under 
the MAL program, producer d ’s profit can be written as 
 
î
í
ì
>--+-
=-
=
0 ,]0,max[
0 if ,],max[
),( 0
tcLpdL
tdpL
td
t
t
MAL
b
p . (7) 
All producers who market their crop at time 0>t  always choose to obtain a loan at 
0=t  because )()()(
)(
)(
*
*
dcLpdLd
dt
dtMAL pbp >--+-³ , where the last inequality 
follows because 1>L . 
Let cLptk t
t --= ]0,max[)( b  denote the “storage” component of the discounted 
profits accrued to the MAL program participants. If Lp £0  and 0)(max >tkt , then all 
producers choose to market their crop at )}({maxarg* tkt tM = . From Result 1 it follows that 
the timing of marketing for producers who took a MAL payment, *Mt , depends positively on 
the loan rate, L  (note that L  plays the role of the basis d  in determining *Mt ). 
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The “disruption” of the optimal sequential supply pattern originates in the fact that 
loan rates are adjusted for local basis. For example, if the loan rate )(dL  is fixed for all 
producers at L , the optimal sequential pattern persists even though the exact timing may 
be different. Let the optimal time of marketing for a producer located at d  be given by 
)(* dtM . 
RESULT 6. For any }{ tp  with Lp ³0  and LdL =)(  d" , )()(
** dtdtM ³  d" . 
The following example shows that condition Lp ³0  is necessary for the result to 
hold. 
EXAMPLE. Let 1=T  and ),0(}{ 1ppt =  where cp >1b . Then in the absence of any 
programs we have 0*0 =d . Under the MAL program with Lcp <- b/1  1p< , 
*
010 0]1/[)]([ dLpcd
M =>---= bb , which violates )()( ** dtdtM ³ . For ],0[ 0
Mdd Î  we 
have 1)(0)( ** =<= dtdtM . 
Thus, in contrast to LDP, a MAL program generally leads to suboptimal marketing 
decisions. Let ò=
1
0
)( dFzW LDPLDP p  and ò=
1
0
)( dFzW MALMAL p  where )(dLDPp  and 
)(dMALp  are indirect profit functions. When  
 0)(max 0 ³-=- pLpL t
t
t b  and  (8) 
 0)( <tk  for all t , (9) 
the MAL program is inferior to LDP as a means of money transfer using aggregate 
producer surplus as a welfare criterion, MALLDP WW ³ .4 This follows from observing that 
)()( dd MALLDP pp ³  for all d  because no MAL producers store their crop. In a general 
case, the comparison between producer welfares under the two programs is ambiguous 
because the amount of transfers depends on the price sequence (its smallest and largest 
elements). 
The Choice between Marketing Assistance Loan and Loan Deficiency Payment 
Options 
When both programs are in operation, producers choose among three alternative 
marketing strategies: sell at harvest for dpL -],max[ 0 , take an LDP and store, or take a 
loan and store. Consider price sequences such that condition (8) holds. Then the two price 
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support schemes, MAL and LDP, converge at 0=t . Hence, at harvest the choice 
between the two programs is indeterminate. Consider the choice between participating in 
LDP and MAL programs for producers marketing at 0>t : 
 )()()()()(
)(
)(
0
*
*
*
dcdppLtkdLd LDP
dt
dt
M
MAL pbp =--+-£>+-= . (10) 
If 0)( * <Mtk , then selling at harvest is clearly a better option than taking a loan and 
storing until 0>t . In this case, all producers with 0)(* >dt  use the LDP program.  If 
0)( * >Mtk , the following result presents a characterization of the relationship between the 
program choice and location based on the strict single-crossing property of the profit 
differential, )()( dd MALLDP pp - . 
RESULT 7. Let 0)( * >Mtk , )0()0(
LDPMAL pp > , )1()1( LDPMAL pp < , and condition (8) 
hold. There exists unique ]1,0[ÎMLd  given by )()( ML
LDP
ML
MAL dd pp =  such that 
)()( dd LDPMAL pp >  for all ),0[ MLdd Î  and )()( dd
LDPMAL pp <  for all ]1,( MLdd Î . 
Note that while )(dLDPp , an indirect profit function, is decreasing and convex, 
)(dMALp  decreases linearly with d . Hence, the point of intersection must be unique and 
must be in the unit interval, so that MAL producers are located in the interval ],0[ MLd , 
and LDP producers are in ]1,( MLd . Otherwise, only one program, MAL if 
)1()1( LDPMAL pp ³  or LDP if )0()0( LDPMAL pp £ , is used when crop is put in storage. The 
presence of both programs (given that the payment under the LDP program is positive) 
may resolve much of the “distortion” in the marketing pattern caused by the MAL 
program when MLd  is low. If 0)(
* =Mtk  producers in ],0[ MLd  are indifferent between 
marketing at 0=t  under either program, or using the MAL program to store until *Mt . 
The previous analysis considered fixed output prices }{ tp . This restrictive 
assumption is relaxed in the following section. 
 
Competitive Equilibrium with Endogenous Prices 
Throughout the rest of the paper, we hold that )( tt sPp =  with ò=
tX
t dFs  where tX  
is the set of producers who market their crop at time t . From Result 1, it follows that 
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],0[ tt dX Í  where })(:sup{
* tdtdd t == , i.e, we know that nobody at tdd >  will 
choose to supply the terminal market at time t . However, we also know that, for 
example, ],0[ 00 dX Í  and Æ=Ç 10 DD . Then, by induction, ],( 1 ttt ddX -= , and hence, 
)()( 1--= ttt dFdFs  where )( 00 dFs =  and )(11 TT dFs -=+ . Observe that if no 
marketing takes place at time t , 1-= tt dd  and 0=ts , which cannot be an equilibrium 
outcome because ¥=)0(P . Hence, the equilibrium price path must satisfy conditions 
(a)-(d) in Result 2. 
The profit of producer at d  who markets his crop at time t  is, therefore, given by 
 
î
í
ì
>---
=-
=
- 0 if ,)))()(((
0 if ,))((
),(
1
0
tcddFdFP
tddFP
td
tt
tb
p . 
If a producer at d  optimally chooses to market his crop at time 0>t , then  
 cddFdFPcddFdFP ll
l
tt
t ---³--- -- )))()((()))()((( 11 bb  0>"l . (11) 
But consider tdd =  and 1+= tl : 
 )))()((())()(( 11 tttttt ddFdFPddFdFP --³-- +- b . (12) 
Condition (12) must hold with equality because otherwise there exists a producer at 
],( 1+Î tt ddd  who can make a higher profit by marketing at time t  instead of time 1+t . 
Also, from Lemma 1 it immediately follows that (12) must hold with equality because it 
must be that 0>ts  t" . And so, the equilibrium sequence }{
*
td  is given by 
 cddFdFPddFP ---=- )))()((())(( 00100 b   
 )))()((())()(( 11 tttttt ddFdFPddFdFP --=-- +- b , Tt ,...,1=   (13) 
where  11 =+Td . 
Note that the difference equation (13) has embedded in it the two initial conditions, 
needed to determine the solution. Namely, we postulate that )0()( 00 FdFs -=  )( 0dF=  
and )(1)()1( TTT dFdFFs -=-= . This also implies that the solution — the equilibrium 
sequence }{ *td  that satisfies (13) — is unique because, by inspection, each given pair of 
1-td  and td  uniquely determines 1+td . The condition that in equilibrium, each producer 
earns a positive discounted profit can always be satisfied only if the “terminating” 
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condition 1+Td  or T  is allowed to vary. This is the case when producers can postpone 
marketing their crop until the following crop year. In a long-run equilibrium when 
production and marketing decisions are tied together, it seems plausible to require that all 
producers make non-negative profits. Clearly, this is always true if )1(),1( -= T
T pT bp  
0)1)1(( ³-->- cPc Tb . Further analyzing (13) gives the following. 
RESULT 8. If 1)1( >P  in the equilibrium with endogenous prices, 0>D tp  t"  and 
0)(2 <D=D tt dFs . 
Next, we characterize equilibrium with the MAL program when prices are deter-
mined endogenously. 
Equilibrium with the Marketing Assistance Loan Program When Prices Are 
Endogenous 
As was shown previously, the timing of marketing for individual producers is 
indeterminate under the MAL program because it does not depend on location (see (7)). 
Because all producers participate in the MAL program competitive arbitrage assures that 
the discounted profits, cLptk t
t --= )()( b , are equalized across time. Then there are 
two distinct equilibrium outcomes:  
 kLp +=0 , if 0)( >= ktk  for all 0>t , and (14) 
 Lp £0 , if 0)( =tk  for all 0>t . (15) 
Even though profits of each producer are higher in equilibrium (14), it may not be 
supportable if the total available supply is large. In what follows, equilibrium in (15) will 
be of most relevance because the LDP program will then be operative. In contrast, 
competitive equilibrium with the LDP program is given by (13), and, hence, producers’ 
marketing decisions remain unchanged relative to equilibrium without any programs. 
Now we turn to an investigation of the properties of equilibrium under both programs. 
The Choice between Marketing Assistance Loan and Loan Deficiency Payment 
Options When Prices Are Endogenous 
Because the equilibrium price sequence is increasing, producer’s profits under 
different marketing strategies can be written as 
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 dpLd -= ],max[)0,( 0p , (sell at 0=t ) 
 cdppLtd t
tLDP --+-= )(]0,max[),( 0 bp , (take LDP, store, and sell at 0>t ) 
 )(),( tkdLtdMAL +-=p  (take loan, store and sell at 0>t  if 0)( ³tk ). 
If 0pL £  then only the MAL program is used and equilibrium is given by (14). 
LDPs are zero at each period because market price rises over time to assure that there is 
some shipping each period.  
If 0pL > , equilibrium prices must satisfy condition 0)( £tk  for all 0>t ; otherwise, 
no producers will find it profitable to sell at 0=t . In this case, the presence of the LDP 
program may resolve some of the indeterminacy of the supply pattern under the MAL 
program alone. Suppose that all producers abandon the LDP program in favor of the 
MAL program. Then the market is supplied by MAL producers and 0)( =tk  for all 
0>t . However, this cannot be in equilibrium unless the set of producers, ]1,( MLd , who 
prefer to use the LDP program, is empty. This may happen only if the “switch” point, 
MLd , is equal to 1. Then we have  
)()()( 0 ddLpLdLd
LDPtMAL pbp =-+-³-=  for all d  and t , 
where condition 0)( =tk  is used to substitute for market price. However, this cannot be 
true for all d  and t  if bb -+< 10 Lp , i.e., if the loan rate is sufficiently high. 
Now suppose that in equilibrium, 0)( =tk  and 0)( <lk , where tl > ; i.e., no 
producers who opted for the MAL program chose to supply the market at time l . Then 
the LDP program participants must supply the market because ¥=)0(P . But none of 
the participants will do so, as ),(),( ldtd LDPLDP pp >  for any d . Therefore, in 
equilibrium it must be that 0)( =lk  for all tl >  if 0)( =tk . On the other hand, 0)( <tk  
implies that )()( tklk <  for all tl <  in equilibrium because LDP producers supply the 
market in these periods. In other words, after harvest, the LDP program participants 
supply the market before the MAL program participants do. Consequently, in 
equilibrium we have 0dd ML =  because only producers in ],0[ 0d  may choose the MAL 
program (see Result 7). 
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Next we show how the possibility of multiple equilibria arises. Observe that, in the 
absence of the MAL program, in equilibrium, )()( tklk >  for any tl > . Let 
}0)(:inf{ˆ ³= tktt  denote the first time after harvest when MAL producers would supply 
the market in the equilibrium given by (13), i.e., in the absence of the MAL program. 
Here, only cases with Tt £ˆ  are of interests because otherwise equilibrium is always 
given by (13) and only producers marketing their crop at harvest may use the MAL 
program. If Tt £ˆ , equilibrium under both programs is characterized by some time tz ˆ³ , 
not necessarily tz ˆ= , such that }0)(:inf{ == tktz . This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 In Figure 2, discounted prices and loan payments are plotted against time. Line A 
depicts the path of discounted prices in the absence of the MAL program; line B is the 
discounted loan payment (at its face value) plus the storage cost (per bushel). When the 
MAL program is in place, line A cannot be in equilibrium because 0)( >tk  for tt ˆ> , 
which means that no producers will supply the market at harvest. An equilibrium price 
path may look like line C; it lies below the discounted loan payment curve for zt <  and 
coincides with it starting at zt = . Note that condition 0pL >  continues to hold in any 
equilibrium with tz ˆ³ . This is because discounted price falls slower when LDP 
 
A
C
B
 
1=t Tt =
cLt +ˆb
cLt +b
t
t pb
cLz +b
tˆ  z
)(tk
 
FIGURE 2. Multiple equilibria 
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producers supply the market. At 0=t , equilibrium is given by cdpp --+= 010 )1( bb . 
Substituting condition 0)()1( 1 <--= cLpk b  yields LdLp <-+< 00 )1( bb  because 
01 dL ³> . 
As was explained earlier, because )(tk  is not a function of d , the spatial supply 
pattern for the MAL program participants is indeterminate. Let ]1,0[Îta  denote the 
share of the MAL producers who store and market their crop at time t . Then the 
quantities supplied are given by )()1( 00 dFs a-= , and )()()( 01 dFdFdFs tttt a+-= +  
where å ==
T
t t1
aa , and )1,(),( += tdtd t
LDP
t
LDP pp  if )1,0(Îtd  and 1-= tt dd  
otherwise. Producers in ],0[ 0d  prefer marketing their crop at 0=t (using either program) 
or taking a loan, storing and marketing at any 0>t  with 0)( =tk , to the LDP option. 
Then, for a fixed time tz ˆ³ , equilibrium with both programs is given by sequences }{ *td  
and }{ *ta such that 
 cddFdFPddFP ---=-- )))()((())()1(( *0
*
0
*
1
*
0
*
0
* ba  for 0=t , (16a) 
 )))()((())()(( *** 1
**
1
*
tttttt ddFdFPddFdFP --=-- +- b  for 1,...,1 -= zt , (16b) 
 )())()(( *** 1
*
z
z
zzz dcLddFdFP -+=--
-
- bb , and 
 0)))()(1(( *0
** =--+- cLdFdFP zz
z ab  for zt = , (16c) 
 0)))((( *0
* =-- cLdFP t
t ab , zt dd =  for Tzt ,...,1+= , (16d) 
where å ==
T
zt t
** aa , 0)))()((( * 1
* <--+ - cLdFdFP tt
tb , and 0* =ta  for 1,...,1 -= zt . 
In general, in equilibrium with Tz £ , the supply pattern (timing of marketing) for 
producers in ],0[ 0d  is indeterminate because they are indifferent between marketing their 
crop at 0=t  and taking a loan and storing until zt ³ . Starting at 1=t , LDP producers in 
],( 1 tt dd -  market their crop at time t  until 1-= zt . At time z , producers in ]1,( 1-zd  
market their crop along with some MAL producers in ],0[ 0d . Starting at 1+= zt , only 
MAL producers supply the market. 
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Consider an extreme case with 1ˆ == tz . Then MAL producers must be indifferent 
to marketing their crop in any period. The case of equilibrium where LDP producers 
supply the market (along with MAL producers) only at 1 ,0=t  is given by  
 )())()1(( *0
*
0
*
0
* dLddFP -=-- ba , for 0=t  (17a) 
 0)))()1(1(( *0
*
1 =---- cLdFP ab , for 1=t  (17b) 
 0)))((( *0
* =-- cLdFP t
t ab , for Tt ,...,2= . (17c) 
The following result is obtained. 
RESULT 9. If (a) L  is large (i.e., 0pL > ); and (b) (1 )D Lb b- + 1 ( )
T t
t
D L cb -
=
+ +å  
1< , then the LDP program must be used in equilibrium. 
In contrast, if condition (b) in the result does not hold, and equilibrium with 1=z  is 
realized, then no LDP producers choose to store their crop because ( ,0)dp =  L d- >  
( , )LDP d tp  for any 0>t  and d . In this equilibrium, even though both programs are 
available, the pattern of spatial supply (the order in which producers supply the market) 
cannot be ascertained for any producer.  
In the absence of any programs, the marketing pattern }{ *td  in competitive 
equilibrium maximizes social welfare measured by the sum of discounted producer and 
consumer surpluses for Tt ,...,0= . Therefore, the LDP program is a socially desirable 
means of income transfer because it does not interfere with marketing and consumption 
decisions. In general, equilibrium “switching times”, Tzt ££ˆ , cannot be ranked in 
terms of social welfare unless some assumptions are made about the composition of 
)( 0dFta , i.e., the order of marketing among the MAL producers. However, it seems 
plausible that equilibrium with Tz =  may be socially preferable to equilibrium with 
Tz <  because the amount of “unordered supply”, )( 0
* dFa , is decreasing with z . 
Basis and County Loan Rate Adjustment Factors 
In the previous analysis, the adjustments in the county loan rates, d , were held equal 
to the actual transportation costs (basis). In this section, this assumption is dropped and 
its implications for the marketing decisions are illustrated. Let the actual basis in location 
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(county) d  be given by )(db . Then producer profits are given by 
 )(],max[)0,( 0 dbpLd -=p , (sell at 0=t ) 
 cdbppLtd t
tLDP --+-= ))((]0,max[),( 0 bp  (take LDP, store, and sell at 0>t ) 
 cddbLpdLtd t
tMAL -+--+-= ))(]0,(max[),( bp  (take loan, store, and sell at 
 0>t ). 
It is straightforward to see that this now makes possible the “alternating” marketing 
pattern, where as the adjustment factor, d , increases, producers switch between the two 
programs several times. For example, we have ),()()0,( tdd MALpp £>  as ( )d b d- >  ( )£  
( max[ ,0] ) /(1 )t ttp L cb b- - - . 
 
Discussion 
The major limitation of the analytical approach used in this paper is ignoring the 
effects of uncertainty on marketing decisions. Broadly speaking, this is likely to bias the 
analysis in favor of the LDP program because the “time value” arising because of price 
volatility of a call option inherent in MAL programs is set at zero. On the other hand, 
LDP programs can also be thought of as offering producers a long position in a put option 
that pays off when commodity prices are low. However, in the case of LDP programs, the 
value of the put option needs to be counterbalanced with the opportunity cost of 
foregoing the sale, as was explained in the introduction. A distinct source of uncertainty 
that may warrant inquiry is the potential discrepancy between the PCP and the actual 
prices offered by elevators and grain processors in the county. Discrepancies occur when 
local market conditions temporarily deviate from adjustment factors, used to determine 
the PCP based on prices in the selected major grain markets.  
Nevertheless, the main message of the paper is not likely to change when a “small” 
amount of uncertainty is introduced. LDP programs appear to be a welfare-enhancing 
means of income transfer because they do not entail any changes in marketing decisions. 
In contrast, MAL programs strip producers of any incentive to supply the market in a 
sequence that constitutes the optimal spatial pattern. The fact that farmers were so eager 
to embrace LDP alternatives when the harvest-time prices triggered these programs 
provides some empirical support for the spatial arbitrage argument used in this paper. 
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Namely, LDP programs preserve the spatial price structure countenanced by producers, 
and they induce producers to choose marketing time to capitalize on their differences in 
transportation costs. 
  
 
 
Endnotes 
1. Maximum likelihood estimation that accounts for spatial autocorrelation among 
adjacent counties reduces the statistical significance of the estimates. Because the 
spatial autocorrelation coefficient is positive, OLS yields downward-biased 
estimated variances when applied to spatial data (e.g., Benirschka and Binkley.) 
2. Note that the maximum transportation cost (or basis) and the total amount of 
production are both normalized to 1. 
3. Proofs are provided in the Appendix. 
4. For example, condition (8) is satisfied if market price rises over time. 
 
 
  
 
 
Appendix 
 Proof of Result 1. From (2) in the text it follows that ),())(,( * tddtd pp ³  for any t . 
In particular, for )(* gtt = , where ]1,0[Îg , 
  ))((ˆ)())((ˆ)( *
)(
)(*
)(
)(
*
*
*
*
gtcdpdtcdp
gt
gt
dt
dt --³-- bb , (A1) 
where 0)(ˆ =tc  if 0=t  and ctc =)(ˆ  if 0>t . 
 Similarly, we can write 
  
))((ˆ)())((ˆ)( *
)(
)(*
)(
)(
*
*
*
*
dtcgpgtcgp
dt
dt
gt
gt --³-- bb
. (A2) 
Summing (A1) and (A2) yields 
  gd dtgtdtgt )()( )()()()(
****
bbbb -³- . 
Hence, the result follows. 
 
 Proof of Lemma 1. Imagine that  
  )( )()1(
)()1(
)()(
u
itit
ititu
itit dpdp ->- +
-+b . 
Then u itd )(  cannot be an equilibrium marginal producer who markets her crop at )(it  
because for some producers in ),( )1()(
u
it
u
it ddd +Î  it is more profitable to market their crops 
at )(it  as well. Similarly, 
  )( )()1(
)()1(
)()(
u
itit
ititu
itit dpdp -<- +
-+b   
cannot hold in equilibrium because then some producers in ),( )()(
u
it
l
it ddd Î  will increase 
their profits by marketing their crop at )1( +it . The same reasoning delivers the other 
statements.  
 
 Proof of Result 2. Conditions (a)–(d) assure that there exist unique )1,0(Îtz  such 
that equations (3) hold and tt zz <-1  for each 0>t :   
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  0 0 1 0( )p z p z cb- = - -  (A3a) 
  1( )t t t tp z p zb +- = -  for 0>t .  (A3b) 
Now we show that ),( 1 tt zzd -Î"  ),(),( ldtd pp >  for tl ¹ . From (A3) it follows that 
for any tzd < , ),1(),( dtdt +> pp . But because we know that lt zz <  for any tl >  and 
tzd < , it follows that ),(),( dldt pp > . Also, from (A3) it follows that for any 1-> tzd  
we have ),(),1( dtdt pp <- . But because we know that tl zz <  for any tl < , it also 
follows that ),(),( dtdl pp >  for any 1-> tzd . Hence, we establish that tz =  
sup{ : ( , ) ( , )d t d l dp p> }tl ¹" = }1 ),(),1(:inf{ +¹">+ tldldtd pp , which implies 
that tt zd =
* . This proves the sufficiency part. 
 The necessity part follows from solving equations (A3) for tt zd =
*  and verifying 
that conditions (a) – (d) must hold if 10 * 1
* <<< +tt dd  for each t , where 
)( 10
*
0 cppd +-= b )1/( b- , and )1/()( 1
* bb --= +ttt ppd  for 0>t .  For example, from 
*
1
*
+< tt dd  it follows that condition (c) must hold: >-=D + ttt ppp 1  
2 1 1( )t t tp p pb b+ + +- = D . 
 
 Proof of Corollary 1. Let condition (i) hold. Equations (3) in the text give 
  0 1 0 0(1 )( ) (1 )( )t tp p d c p p d cb bD = - - + = - D + - + , 
  1(1 )( ) (1 )( )t t t t t tp p d p p db b+D = - - = - D + -  0>"t . 
Solving for tpD  yields 
  0 0 0
1 1 1
( ) ( ) (1) 0t
c c c
p p d d
b b b
p p
b b b b b b
- - -
D = - + = + ³ + > , 
  1 1
1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) (1) 0t t t tt tp p d d c c
b b b b b
p p
b b b b b+ +
- - - - -
D = - = + ³ + >  0>"t . (A4) 
Now let condition (ii) hold.  From condition (d) in Result 2 it follows that 
1 ( 1 ) /T T Tp p pb b+ > - + >  where the last inequality holds when (ii) is satisfied.  From 
condition (c) in Result 2 it follows that 0>D tp  if 0>D Tp . 
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 Proof of Result 3.  From the conditions imposed on market prices it follows that 
1t tp pb +>  0>"t . Rewriting this inequality with 1/(1 )rb= + yields 1)1( +>+ tt ppr , or 
rpp tt <D / . From equation (A4) in the proof of Corollary 1 it follows that 0>D tp  
implies tt dp >  0>"t .  Also using (A4), we can write  
  )
)1(
(
1
)(
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
+
+
++
+
+
+ -
-+
-
=-
-
=
D
-
D
t
t
tt
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
p
d
dp
d
p
d
p
d
p
p
p
p
bbb
b
b
b
. 
Observe that the denominator in the first term of the last difference converges to 1+tp  
( td ) as 1b ®  ( 0b ® ). This, in combination with ttt ddp >> ++ 11 , completes the proof. 
 
 Proof of Result 4.  Note that function (5) in the text is separable in ),...,( 0 Tdd . The 
FOC and SOSC for the maximization problem are given by 
  0)))(()(( 01000 £----=¶
¶
cdpdpdf
d
W
t
b , (A5) 
  0)))(()()(( 1
1 £-----=
¶
¶
+
+ cdpcdpdf
d
W
tt
t
tt
t
t
t
bb , Tt ,...,1= , (A6) 
  0)1()(2
2
£+-=
¶
¶
bb tt
t
df
d
W
, Tt ,...,0= . (A7) 
Comparing (3) in the text with (A5) and (A6) proves the result. 
 
 Proof of Result 5. The case with Lp >0  is trivial. Consider Lp <0 . Then all 
producers optimally choose 0)( =dq . This follows from differentiating 
]0,max[ t
t pL -b  with respect to t . Alternatively, the technique used in proving Result 1 
can be applied. Next, we show that the optimal timing of shipping is not affected. The 
equilibrium )(* dtL  is characterized by the condition 
  cdppLcdppL
lt
lt
dt
dt
L
L
L
L ˆ)(ˆ)(
)(
)(
0)(
)(
0 *
*
*
*
--+-³--+- bb  l" . (A8) 
Canceling 0pL -  confirms the equivalence of (A8) and (A1). 
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 Proof of Result 6.  Clearly, for any }0 ,:{ TtLptRt t <<£=Î  no sales take place 
because discounted profits can be increased by waiting until t  such that Lpt >  or Tt = . 
Rewrite ),( tdMALp  for Rt Ï   
 
î
í
ì
Ï-+-+
=-
=
RtcdLpL
tdpL
td
t
t
MAL
 if ,))((
0 if ,],max[
),( 0
b
p . 
The equilibrium 0)(* >dtM  is characterized by conditions 
 cLdpLdp
gt
gt
M
M -+-³+- ))(()(
)(
)(
0 *
*
b , if 0)(* =dtM    (A9a) 
 cgLpLcdLpL
gt
gt
dt
dt
M
M
M
M -+-+³-+-+ ))(())((
)(
)(
)(
)(
*
*
*
*
bb  ]1,0[Î"g . (A9b) 
Inspecting (A9) and (A1), we conclude that )()()( *** dtLdtdtM ³+=  for all d . 
  
 Proof of Result 7.  Note that it is enough to show that if )()( dd LDPMAL pp £  for 
some d , then )()( gg LDPMAL pp <  for any dg > . By definition of )(gp , we have 
  cgpg
dt
dt --³ )()(
)(
)(
*
*
bp . 
By assumption, the following holds for d : 
  )()1( *)(0)(
)( *
*
*
M
dt
dt
dt tkdpcp +-->- bb . 
Combining the last two inequalities gives 
  )()()1()( *0
)(*)(
0
**
M
dt
M
dt tkgpgtkdpg +->-+--> bbp . 
Substituting )()( 0 gpLg
LDP pp +-=  confirms the statement. Observe that condition 
0)( * >Mtk  is only needed to avoid the indeterminacy of the producer’s choice at 0=t . 
 
 Proof of Result 8.  Because 1)1( >P , it follows that for any ]1,( 1-Î tdd  
ddFdFP t >- - ))()(( 1  for each 11 <-td . Using the technique from Corollary 1 gives 
0 0 0
1
( ( ( ) ) 0
c
p P F d d
b
b b
-
D = - + >  and 1
1
( ( ( ) ( )) ) 0t t t tp P F d F d d
b
b -
-
D = - - > . 
This implies that 1-< tt ss  t"  and thus 
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  =D )(2 tdF ))()(()()( 11 -+ --- tttt dFdFdFdF 0<D= ts . 
 
 Proof of Result 9. Note that the LDP program may not be used in equilibrium with 
0pL >  only if 1== Mtz . Hence, we focus on this case. Solving equations (17b) and 
(17c) in the text yields 
  )(/))/(1(1 0
*
1 dFcLD ba +--= ,  
  )(/)( 0
* dFcLD tt
-+= ba , Tt ,...,2= . 
Hence, we can write  
  )(/]1)([1)( 010
* dFcLDd
T
t
t -++= å = -ba . 
Note that )(/)()1(/ 00
*
0
* dFdfd aa -=¶¶ . Differentiating ))())(1(( 00
* dFdP a- with 
respect to 0d  yields 
  0)]()1()()1([
))())(1((
0
*
0
*
0
00
*
=-+--¢=
¶
-¶
dfdfP
d
dFdP
aa
a
. 
Then (17a) has a unique solution )1,0(*0 Îd  if  
  LP bba +-<- 1))1(1( * . 
Substituting for )1(*a  and inverting completes the proof. 
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